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Abstract
It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems, pairwise-
stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations, unlike in many-to-one
matching problems (Blair 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability
is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive prefer-
ences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly
group-stable matching is immune to any ￿executable￿ group deviations with an
appropriate de￿nition of executability. Under the same preference restriction, we
also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the
set of matchings generated by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of an appropriately
de￿ned strategic-form game.
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11 Introduction
Following the success of the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) in stabiliz-
ing the United States hospital-intern market (see Roth [17], Roth and Sotomayor [23],
and Roth and Peranson [22]), the United Kingdom also adopted centralized match-
ing procedures in the markets for medical internships in the 1960s. However, there
are two important diﬀerences between the UK programs and their North American
counterparts (Roth [21]). First, the UK medical intern markets are organized region-
ally rather than nationally: in diﬀerent regions, diﬀerent algorithms were adopted by
central matching programs. Many of those were abandoned after several years and
replaced by new algorithms. An intriguing observation here is that the abandoned
algorithms all produced pairwise-unstable matchings and their successor algorithms all
produced pairwise-stable matchings. One region adopted a pairwise-stable matching
algorithm from the start, and it has been used successfully since. Roth [21] suggested
that this natural experiment in the UK markets proved the robustness of pairwise-
stable matchings.
Second, in the UK markets, each medical student is required to complete two in-
ternships, one medical and one surgical, in a period of twelve months, to be eligible
for full registration as doctors (no such categories exist in the US). Each internship
lasts for six months. Consultants in teaching hospitals seek some number of students
to ￿ll internships in either medicine or surgery.1 Thus, given the requirement of UK
interns to experience both medical and surgical positions, each regional market in the
UK needs to be modeled as a ￿special￿ two-sided many-to-two matching problem, un-
like in the US market. Even in this problem, the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance
algorithms (Gale and Shapley [9]) yield pairwise-stable matchings under a preference
restriction (Roth [18,20], Blair [5]). However, this outcome may no longer be group-
stable in a many-to-two matching problem (Blair [5], Roth [21]). This shows a clear
contrast with a many-to-one matching market like the US hospital intern market. Al-
though a pairwise-stable matching is required to be immune to only one- or two-agent
deviations, Roth [17] showed that if a larger size coalition can deviate from a matching,
then a coalition of size one or two can also deviate in many-to-one matching problem.
Thus, a pairwise-stable matching is also immune to group deviations. Hence, market
stabilization by introduction of centralized matching programs is well justi￿ed. How-
ever, in many-to-two (-many) matching problems, there can be a group deviation from
a pairwise-stable matching that improves the payoﬀ of every member of the deviation.
Thus pairwise-stable matchings are not even Pareto-eﬃcient. This creates a puzzle:
Why is the pairwise-stable matching so robust in the UK markets?
1In the UK market, consultants rather than hospitals are the agents who hire medical students.
2In this paper, we provide theoretical support for the robustness of pairwise stability
allowing for group deviations in many-to-many matching problems. Unlike many-to-
one matching problems, a pairwise-stable matching may not be immune to any group
deviations in many-to-many matching problems. However, a closer look at possible
group deviations from a pairwise-stable matching reveals that these deviations are not
credible in a certain way. Even if a group of agents would bene￿tf r o md e v i a t i n g
by reorganizing their partnerships, some members may not have incentive to follow
the suggested reorganization completely. Consider the following situation. A group
is somehow organized, and the members of the group communicate with each other
about a deviation plan, and they agree on carrying it out the next day without letting
outsiders know about the plan. In the plan, it has been suggested to each of the
group￿s members that she should discontinue some existing partnerships while keeping
others and forming some new partnerships with other members. Do all the members
follow the suggestion? Some members may choose to follow the plan only partially.
For example, it may be even more pro￿table for some of them not to form some of the
suggested partnerships, but instead to keep some existing partnerships they were told
to discontinue. In such a case, the suggested group deviation cannot be carried out
successfully (unless a group can form a binding agreement). In this case, we say that
these deviations are not ￿executable.￿ More precisely: an executable group deviation
is a deviation with a proposed matching that speci￿es each member￿s partners and is
pairwise-stable within the members of the coalition, assuming outsiders of the coalition
are passive agents.2 We say that a matching is credibly group-stable if it is immune to
any executable group deviation.
The ￿rst main result of this paper is that the set of credibly group-stable matchings
is equivalent to the set of pairwise-stable matchings when one side has responsive
preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences (Theorem 1).
This domain is natural in the sense that it is the simplest preference domain in the
UK hospital-intern markets based on agents￿ preferences over individuals. As in the
US hospital-intern market, agents submit their preferences over individual partners
(interns submit preference rankings over individual consultants in each category), not
over subsets of partners to the central authority that conducts the match.3
2Pairwise stability within the deviation group with passive outsiders prevents the following two
cases of possible further deviations: a member of the coalition may not want to form some of the links
she is supposed to form according to the plan, and she may keep some of the links with outsiders she
was told to discontinue; or a pair of members of the group, who are supposed to discontinue links with
each other according to the plan, may not go along with the recommendation.
3The U.K. markets are regional. That is, all positions are in the same geographical area. Moreover,
the two jobs are not served simultaneously, but consecutively one after another. However, the match
3Credible group stability requires only that no group deviation from a matching is
executable. However, there is no guarantee that an executable group deviation itself
will be immune to further executable deviations. Thus, to be consistent, game theorists
may say that credibility of group deviation should be de￿ned recursively: a deviation
is said to be credible if it is immune to further credible deviations. In strategic-form
games, a strategy pro￿le is said to be a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim,
Peleg, and Whinston [4]) if it is immune to any credible deviation in this sense.4 Our
second result shows that the set of matchings generated as outcomes of the coalition-
proof Nash equilibria of a strategic-form game appropriately generated from a many-
to-many matching problem coincides with the set of credibly group-stable matchings of
the same matching problem in the same preference domain as in Theorem 1 (Theorem
2). Theorems 1 and 2 provide justi￿cations for Roth￿s [21] observation of the UK
medical intern markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model
and de￿ne traditional solution concepts in the literature as well as our new solution
concept, credible group stability. We provide examples that illustrate the diﬀerences
between these concepts. In Section 3, we start with a weak preference restriction,
substitutability (Kelso and Crawford [13]). We ￿rst show that a credibly group-stable
matching is pairwise-stable (Proposition 1), while a pairwise-stable matching may not
be credibly group-stable as long as one side has substitutable preferences even if the
other side has responsive preferences (Example 4). In Section 3, we prove the equiva-
lence between pairwise stability and credible group stability if one side has responsive
preferences and the other has categorywise-responsive preferences (Theorem 1). How-
ever, when both sides have categorywise-responsive preferences, the equivalence result
may fail (Example 5), and even credibly group-stable matching may not exist (Example
6). In Section 4, we consider a natural strategic-form game of many-to-many matching
problems and show that the set of the matchings generated through the coalition-proof
Nash equilibria of this game, the set of pairwise-stable matchings, and the set of cred-
is done simultaneously. These all reduce the possibility of having complementary preferences over the
two jobs and support categorywise-responsive preferences assumption.
4A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is a strategy pro￿le that is immune to any credible strategic
coalitional changes in the members￿ strategies, and the credibility of strategic coalitional deviations is
de￿ned recursively in a consistent manner (see Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston [4]). Our equivalence
result gives us another reason that our non-characte r i s t i cf u n c t i o na p p r o a c hi sm o r ep r e f e r a b l et h a n
the characteristic function approach in matching problems. The counterpart of a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium in a characteristic function form game is t h ec r e d i b l ec o r ein Ray [16] that checks credibility
of coalitional deviations recursively. However, as is shown in Ray [16], the core and the credible core
are equivalent in characteristic function form games. Ray￿s remarkable result also motivates our usage
of non-characteristic function form games.
4ibly group-stable matchings are all equivalent under the same preference domain as
in Section 3 (Theorem 2). Section 5 concludes the paper with an application of our
results in non-bipartite matching markets.
1.1 Related Literature
The most closely related paper is an independent work by Echenique and Oviedo [8] on
many-to-many matching problems. They use setwise stability as de￿n e db yR o t h[ 1 8 ]
as their solution concept. A setwise-stable matching is a matching that is immune to
any group deviations in which participating members have no incentive to discontinue
any partnership after the deviation. One of the main results in Echenique and Oviedo
[8] is that if one side has substitutable preferences and the other has ￿strongly substi-
tutable￿ preferences, then pairwise stability and setwise stability are equivalent. Our
main result states that if one side has categorywise-responsive preferences and the other
side has responsive preferences, then pairwise-stability and credible group-stability are
equivalent. Although these two result may appear similar, they have no logical re-
lationship with each other, since neither solution concepts nor preference domains in
these two statements are the same. Setwise stability is a stronger solution concept
than our credible group stability, since the executability requirement rules out more
group deviations than individual stability. In the general preference domain, we have
group-stable set ⊆ setwise-stable set ⊆ credibly group-stable set ⊆ pairwise-stable set.
Although categorywise-responsive preferences belong to a family of substitutable pref-
erences, strongly substitutable preferences have no logical relationship with responsive
preferences (with quotas).5
In many-to-one matching problems, Kelso and Crawford [13] showed that the Gale-
Shapley deferred-acceptance algorithm still ￿nds (pairwise-)stable matchings under
substitutable preferences. Subsequently, Roth [18, 20, 21] and Blair [5] studied the
structure of the set of pairwise-stable matchings in a many-to-many setting under sub-
stitutable preferences. On the lattice structure of pairwise-stable matchings, Blair [5],
Alkan [2], and Echenique and Oviedo [8] provided results in many-to-many match-
ing problems using diﬀerent de￿nitions of supremum (and in￿mum) under diﬀerent
preference domains.
In many-to-one matching problems with responsive preferences, a randomized my-
opic adjustment process also yields a pairwise-stable matching with probability one (see
Roth and Vande Vate [24]. In particular, if an initial matching is randomly selected,
5Indeed, as Sotomayor [26] pointed out in her example (see Example 3 below), the set of setwise-
stable matchings may be empty under separable preferences (which is a weaker requirement than
responsive preferences).
5every pairwise stable matching can realize with a positive probability. In our separate
note (Konishi and ￿nver [14]), we show that a similar convergence result still holds in
many-to-many matching problems if agents have categorywise-responsive preferences.
This result justi￿es our characterization of the whole set of pairwise-stable matchings
instead of the optimal matchings generated by the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance
algorithms.
2 The Model
2.1 Many-to-Many Matching Problem
Let F and W be ￿nite sets of ￿r m sa n dw o r k e r sw i t hF ∩ W = ∅. For any agent
i ∈ F ∪ W,t h eset of potential partners Mi is the set of agents on the other side:
i.e., Mi = W if i ∈ F,a n dMi = F if i ∈ W.W e d e ￿ne a preference pro￿le by
”=( ”F,”W)=( ( ”i)i∈F∪W),w h e r e”i is a preference ordering over 2Mi.W ea l s ou s e
notations ”=( ”F,”W),w h e r e”F and ”W denote preference pro￿les for F and W,
respectively. We assume throughout the paper that for any agent i ∈ F ∪ W,a g e n t
i￿s preference relation ”i is strict: i.e. ”i is a linear order, meaning that for any
S,T ⊆ Mi, S ”i T implies that S = T or S ￿i T.A many-to-many matching
problem is a list (F,W,”).W e ￿x a many-to-many matching problem (F,W,”) in
the rest of the paper. A matching ￿ is a mapping from the set F ∪W into the set of
all subsets of F ∪ W such that for all i,j ∈ F ∪ W:( i )￿(i) ∈ 2Mi,a n d( i i )j ∈ ￿(i) if
and only if i ∈ ￿(j).
2.2 Preference Restrictions
A commonly used preference restriction in matching theory is responsiveness with
quota. Agent i￿s preference relation ”i is responsive with quota i ft h e r ei sap o s i t i v e
integer qi such that for any T ⊂ Mi with |T| <q i,a n da n yj,j0 ∈ Mi\T,w eh a v e 6
(i) T ∪ {j}￿ i T ∪ {j
0} ⇔ j ￿i j
0 and
(ii) T ∪ {j}￿ i T ⇔ j ￿i ∅,
and for any T ⊆ Mi with |T| >q i,w eh a v e∅ ￿i T (Roth [19]).7 A preference pro￿le
”T is responsive if for any i ∈ T, ”i is responsive with some quota qi.
6Without confusion, we abuse notations: j ”i j0, ∅ ”i j and j ”i ∅ denote {j}” i {j0}, {j}” i ∅
and ∅ ”i {j}, respectively, for any j,j0 ∈ Mi.
7Note that under a strict preference ordering, Condition (ii) implies T ￿i T ∪{j} ⇔∅￿i j as well.
Also note that Condition (ii) is commonly referred to as ￿separability￿ in the literature.
6Substitutability is a weaker preference restriction than responsiveness, yet some of
the important results obtained with responsive preferences are preserved under substi-
tutability: it still guarantees the existence of pairwise-stable matchings and the validity
of the polarization results in many-to-many matching problems (Roth [18]). For any
i ∈ F ∪ W,a n da n yS ⊂ Mi,l e tChi(S) ⊆ S be such that Chi(S) ”i T for any
T ⊆ S.A g e n ti￿s preference relation ”i is substitutable if for any S ⊆ Mi and any
distinct j,j0 ∈ Chi(S),w eh a v ej ∈ Chi(S\{j0}) (Kelso and Crawford [13]). For any
T ⊆ F ∪W, a preference pro￿le ”T is substitutable if for any i ∈ T, ”i is substitutable.
We now introduce a new preference restriction that is stronger than substitutability
but weaker than responsiveness with quota. This preference restriction retains the
virtues of responsive preferences yet makes it possible to analyze a market like the UK
hospital-intern market. We ￿rst introduce the notion of categories of partners. For
each agent i ∈ F ∪W, let Ki be a ￿nite set called the set of categories for i,a n dl e t
{Mk
i }k∈Ki be a partition of Mi.A g e n ti￿s preference relation ”i is separable across





if for any category k ∈ Ki,a n yS,T ⊆ Mk
i ,
and any I,J ⊆ Mi\Mk
i ,w eh a v e
S ∪ I ”i T ∪ I ⇔ S ∪ J ”i T ∪ J.
Agent i￿s preference relation ”i is categorywise-responsive with quotas if there are
a set of categories Ki, a partition {Mk
i }k∈Ki of Mi, and a vector of quotas qi =( qk
i )k∈Ki






in each category k ∈ Ki, the restriction of ”i to 2Mk
i is responsive with quota qk
i .A
preference pro￿le ”T is categorywise-responsive if for any i ∈ T, ”i is categorywise-
responsive with some quota vector qi =( qk
i )k∈Ki. Note that categorywise-responsive
preferences are substitutable.8 A regional UK medical intern market can be mod-
eled as a many-to-many matching problem where one side has responsive preferences
(consultants), whereas the other has categorywise-responsive preferences with quotas
(interns).9 Let F and W denote consultants and interns, respectively. Each consultant
j ∈ F specializes either in medicine or surgery, i.e., F is partitioned into Fm and Fs.
No consultant j categorizes interns, and thus she can have responsive preferences with
8For agent i,l e t”i be categorywise-responsive and for T ⊆ Mi,l e t{j,h} ⊆ Chi (T).
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of ”i across categories implies h ∈ Chi (T\{j}).
(ii) If j and h are partners in diﬀerent categories for agent i: By separability of ”i across categories,
we have h ∈ Chi (T\{j}) completing the proof that ”i is substitutable.
9In the UK markets, matching mechanisms utilize students￿ preference orderings over individual
consultants in each category. Given these mechanisms, the simplest assumption on preference domain
of students is categorywise-responsive preferences.
7quota qj that is the number of positions j has. On the other hand, each intern i ∈ I has
category set Ki = {m,s} with Mm
i = Fm and Ms
i = Fs, and she also has a unit quota
for each category, i.e. qm
i = qs
i =1 . Using substitutability, the UK medical intern
markets can be formulated as a many-to-two matching problem without introducing
two categories (see Roth [21]). However, to use this formulation, we need to give up
the equivalence between pairwise stability and credible group stability (see Section 3).
In independent work, Echenique and Oviedo [8] introduced another preference re-
striction. Agent i￿s preference ”i is strongly substitutable if for any S,T ⊆ Mi
with S ￿i T, j ∈ Chi(S ∪ {j}) implies j ∈ Chi(T ∪ {j}). There is no logical re-
lationship between responsiveness and strong substitutability (Echenique and Oviedo
[8]).10 A preference pro￿le ”T is strongly substitutable if for any i ∈ T, ”i is strongly
substitutable.
2.3 Solution Concepts
In this subsection, we discuss solution concepts used in this paper. First, for any agent
i ∈ F ∪ W, we say that set S ⊆ Mi is individually rational for i if S ”i ∅,a n di s
individually stable for i if Chi (S)=S. Obviously, individual stability implies indi-
vidual rationality, but not vice versa. We also say that a matching ￿ is individually
rational (individually stable)i f￿(i) is individually rational (individually stable)
for any i ∈ F ∪ W.W e s a y t h a t f o r a n y a g e n t i ∈ F ∪ W, j ∈ Mi is acceptable if
j ”i ∅. Under substitutable preferences, although an individually stable set contains
only acceptable partners, an individually rational set may contain unacceptable part-
ners. The central solution concept in the (two-sided) matching literature is pairwise
stability. A matching ￿ is pairwise-stable if (i) for any i ∈ F ∪W, Chi(￿(i)) = ￿(i),
i.e. ￿(i) is individually stable, and (ii) for any i,j ∈ F ∪ W with i ∈ Mj, j ∈ Mi,a n d
j/ ∈ ￿(i),w eh a v ej ∈ Chi(￿(i) ∪ {j}) implies i/ ∈ Chj(￿(j) ∪ {i}). For any matching
￿, if there is an agent i with Chi(￿(i)) 6= ￿(i), then we say that individual i blocks ￿,
and if there is a ￿rm f ∈ F and worker w ∈ W\￿(f) with w ∈ Chf(￿(f) ∪ {w}) and
f ∈ Chw(￿(w) ∪ {f}), then we say that pair (f,w) blocks ￿.
We will introduce two group stability concepts in characteristic function form
games. A matching ￿0 dominates am a t c h i n g￿ via coalition T ⊆ F ∪ W if (i)
for all i ∈ T, j ∈ ￿0(i) implies j ∈ T, and (ii) ￿0(i) ￿i ￿(i) for all i ∈ T. Condition (i)
requires that after deviation, members of T can be matched only with other members of
T (characteristic function form game). The core of the problem is the set of matchings
10Imagine that f ∈ F has preference ordering {w1,w 2}￿ f {w1,w 3}￿ f {w1}￿ f {w2}￿ f {w3}￿ f
∅. This preference ordering is strongly substitutable, while it is not responsive with quota two. For
the other direction, see Example 3 below.
8that are not dominated by any other matching. A matching ￿0 weakly dominates a
matching ￿ via coalition T ⊆ F ∪ W if (i) for any i ∈ T, j ∈ ￿0(i) implies j ∈ T, (ii)
we have ￿0(i) ”i ￿(i) for all i ∈ T, and (iii) ￿0(i) ￿i ￿(i) holds for some i ∈ T.T h e
weak core of the problem is the set of matchings that are not weakly dominated by
any other matching.
As we will see below, the characteristic function approach has a limitation in the
many-to-many matching problem. Other solution concepts do not assume that devi-
ators need to discontinue all partnerships with outsiders. Let ￿ be a matching. A
matching ￿0 is obtainable from ￿ via deviation by T if for any i ∈ F ∪ W and
any j ∈ Mi,( i )j ∈ ￿0(i)\￿(i) implies {i,j} ⊆ T,a n d( i i )j ∈ ￿(i)\￿0(i) implies
{i,j}∩T 6= ∅.Agroup deviation from ￿ is a group and a matching pair (T,￿0) such
that (i) ￿0 is obtainable from ￿ via T, and (ii) for any i ∈ T we have ￿0(i) ￿i ￿(i).W e
say a matching ￿ is group-stable if ￿ is immune to any group deviation from ￿.11
We now discuss two notions of credibility of group deviations. The ￿rst notion is
setwise stability introduced by Roth [20] and Sotomayor [26]. A group deviation (T,￿0)
from ￿ is individually stable if ￿0 is an individually stable matching. A matching ￿ is
setwise-stable if ￿ is immune to any individually stable group deviation. The second
notion, which is newly introduced in this paper, is a stronger credibility requirement
than setwise stability. A group deviation (T,￿0) from ￿ is executable if
(i) for any i ∈ T, Chi(￿0(i) ∪ (￿(i)\T)) = ￿0(i),a n d
(ii) for any i,j ∈ T with j ∈ Mi\￿0(i), j ∈ Chi(￿0(i) ∪ (￿(i)\T) ∪ {j}) implies
i/ ∈ Chj(￿0(j) ∪ (￿(j)\T) ∪ {i}).
This requires that ￿0 is pairwise-stable within the members of T assuming that out-
siders are passive players. That is, individual stability requires only that no member of
T has an incentive to discontinue some of partnerships after a deviation, whereas exe-
cutability requires that after the deviation, the new matching is pairwise-stable within
T assuming that the outsiders are passive agents. A matching ￿ that is immune to
any executable group deviation is called a credibly group-stable matching. Credible
group stability is a weaker solution than setwise stability, since credibility requirements
on group deviations are more demanding in the case of executability.
11Group stability is originally de￿ned for many-to-one matching problems (see de￿nition 5.4 in
Roth and Sotomayor [23]). We extend this de￿nition to many-to-many matching problems. Group
stability is also the same concept as strong stability in network games as de￿ned in Jackson and van
den Nouweland [11].
92.4 Core and Weak Core
It is well known that in one-to-one matching problems the core and the pairwise-stable
set coincide, i.e., the set of pairwise-stable matchings is equivalent to the core and
to the weak core. It is also true that in many-to-one matching problems, the set of
pairwise-stable matchings and the weak core coincide, although the core may be bigger.
This equivalence result no longer holds in many-to-many matching problems. The
following simple example (a simpli￿ed version of Example 2.6 in Blair [5]) illustrates
the diﬀerence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the weak core in many-
to-many matching problems.
Example 1 Consider a many-to-many matching problem with F = {f1,f 2} and W =
{w1,w 2}. Quota for the number of matches for each agent is two. Their preferences
are given as follows:
f1 f2 w1 w2
{w1}{ w2}{ f2}{ f1}
{w1,w 2}{ w2,w 1}{ f2,f 1}{ f1,f 2}
∅∅ ∅ ∅
{w2}{ w1}{ f1}{ f2}
In this game, the unique pairwise-stable matching is matching ￿ with ￿(i)=∅ for
all i ∈ F ∪ W, and the unique weak core matching is a complete matching ￿0 with
￿0(i)=Mi for all i ∈ F ∪ W. It is easy to see that empty matching ￿ is the unique
pairwise-stable matching, since for each pair (i,j) we have either ∅ ￿i j or ∅ ￿j i
and preferences are responsive with quota 2. It is also easy to see that the complete
matching ￿0 i st h eo n l yw e a kc o r em a t c h i n g ,s i n c e￿0 is strictly individually rational,
and no group deviation can improve upon ￿0. ⁄
In many-to-many matching problems, the weak core does not make much sense.
This can be seen from the fact that in the above example the weak core matching ￿0 is
not even pairwise-stable. This is because, in the de￿nition of weak core or core, a group
deviation T (including a single agent deviation) has to act within T,a n dt h em e m b e r s
have to discontinue all the partnerships with members of (F ∪ W)\T. For example,
consider f1. Under ￿0, f1 is matched with w1 and w2. She wants to discontinue a
partnership with w2, but wants to keep a partnership with w1.I nt h ed e ￿nition of weak
core, if f1 alone wants to deviate, f1 needs to discontinue all partnerships. But why
should w1 need to discontinue her partnership with f1 in response to f1￿s discontinuing
her partnership with w2? It is not clear, especially because w1 does not care what
happens to a match between f1 and w2: there is no such spillover or externality in
10this game. Actually, this is precisely why the weak core and the core are not the same
in many-to-one matching problems even under strict preference orderings. Without
including unaﬀected agents in a group deviation, a pair of agents cannot form a new
partnership. However, in the many-to-one matching problems, it is still possible to
argue that pairwise stability is a relevant game-theoretic concept, since we can keep
the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the weak core. In
many-to-many matching problems, the problem with the weak core is more severe,
as we have seen. Our observation points out the limitation of describing a matching
problem as a characteristic function form game.
Before closing this subsection, we provide an example that has an empty core in a
many-to-many matching problem: the core may be empty in the characteristic function
form game even under responsive preferences.
Example 2 Consider a many-to-many matching problem with F = {f1,f 2,f 3,f 4,f 5}
and W = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4,w 5}. Quotas are all two. The preference pro￿le is responsive
and given as follows:
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
{w2,w 3}{ w3,w 1}{ w1,w 2}{ w2}{ w1}
{w2,w 4}{ w3,w 5}{ w1}{ w2,w1}{ w1,w2}




{w2,w 5}{ w3,w 4}{ w2,w3}
{w3}{ w1} ∅









11w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
{f1,f 4}{ f2,f 5}{ f3}{ f2}{ f1}
{f1}{ f2}{ f3,f1}{ f2,f1}{ f1,f2}











Choices in bold characters are the relevant choices that compose individually rational
matchings. Note that for each k ∈ {1,2,3}, ￿rm fk d o e sn o tw a n tt ob em a t c h e d
with {wk},b u tf o re a c h‘ ∈ {1,2,3}\{k}, {w‘,w k} is individually rational for fk.
However, for each k ∈ {1,2,3},w o r k e rwk wants to be matched with {fk},a n df o r
each ‘ ∈ {1,2,3}\k, worker wk does not mind being matched with {fk,f ‘} (which is a
strictly worse match than {fk}), but she does not want to be matched with {f‘}.N o t e
also that ￿rms f1 and f2 (workers w1 and w2) do not want to be matched with {w5} and
{w4} ({f5} and {f4}), respectively, but each of them does not mind being matched with
the partner set {w4,w 5} ({f4,f 5}), although this is a less favorable partner set. We will
show that the core of this problem is empty. Inspecting individually rational matchings
will be suﬃcient for determining the core, since a core matching is individually rational.
There are nine individually rational matchings (￿1,...,￿9)i nt h i se x a m p l e . 12 We list
them as follows:
￿1(f1)={w2,w 1},￿ 1(f2)={w1,w 2},￿ 1(f3)=￿1(f4)=￿1(f5)=∅;
￿2(f2)={w3,w 2},￿ 2(f3)={w2,w 3},￿ 2(f1)=￿2(f4)=￿2(f5)=∅;
￿3(f1)={w3,w 1},￿ 3(f3)={w1,w 3},￿ 3(f2)=￿3(f4)=￿3(f5)=∅;
￿4(f1)={w3,w 1},￿ 4(f2)={w1,w 2},￿ 4(f3)={w2,w 3},￿ 4(f4)=￿4(f5)=∅;
￿5(f1)={w2,w 1},￿ 5(f2)={w3,w 2},￿ 5(f3)={w1,w 3},￿ 5(f4)=￿5(f5)=∅;
￿6(f1)={w4,w 5},￿ 6(f2)={w5,w 4},￿ 6(f3)=￿6(f4)=￿6(f5)=∅;
￿7(f4)={w2,w 1},￿ 7(f5)={w1,w 2},￿ 7(f1)=￿7(f2)=￿7(f3)=∅;
￿8(f1)={w4,w 5},￿ 8(f2)={w5,w 4},￿ 8(f3)=∅,￿ 8(f4)={w2,w 1},￿ 8(f5)={w1,w 2};
￿9(f1)=￿9(f2)=￿9(f3)=￿9(f4)=￿9(f5)=∅;
None of the above matchings is in the core, although matching ￿9 is the unique
12The proof is available upon request.
12pairwise-stable matching. For each individually rational matching, there is a match-
ing that dominates it via a coalition: ￿1 →{f2,f3,w2,w3} ￿2, ￿2 →{f1,f3,w1,w3} ￿3,
￿3 →{f1,f2,w1,w2} ￿1, ￿4 →{f1,f2,w4,w5} ￿6, ￿5 →{f4,f5,w1,w2} ￿7, ￿6 →{f1,f2,f3,w1,w2,w3} ￿5,
￿7 →{f1,f2,f3,w1,w2,w3} ￿4, ￿8 →{f2,f3,w2,w3} ￿2,a n d￿9 is dominated by any other indi-
vidually rational matching via the coalition of matched agents. Thus, the core (and the
w e a kc o r e )i se m p t y . ⁄
2.5 Group Stability, Setwise Stability, and Credible Group
Stability
The main problem of using a solution concept in a characteristic function form game
is that the ability of a coalition is limited to the set of matchings within the coalition.
Group deviations give more power to deviators by allowing them to keep existing
partnerships if they wish.
Although group stability is a natural concept, unfortunately, the set of group-stable
matchings may be empty in many-to-many matching problems. It is indeed empty in
Example 1, although it is a very simple setup. A pair (F ∪ W, ￿0) is a group deviation
from the unique pairwise-stable matching ￿, and since a group-stable matching must
be pairwise-stable, there is no group-stable matching in this problem. Thus, we need
to discuss credibility of group deviations (see Section 2.3 for de￿nitions).
It is easy to see that the group deviation (F ∪ W, ￿0) from ￿ is not individually
stable: agents are matched with unacceptable partners. This implies that, in Example
1, the unique pairwise-stable matching is setwise-stable, and we can get around the
nonexistence problem of a group-stable matching. However, it is not always the case
under responsive preferences. The following example (a simpli￿ed version of Example
3 in Sotomayor [26]) illustrates the diﬀerence between executability and individual
stability.
Example 3 Consider the following many-to-many matching problem. Quotas are all
two. Let F = {f1,f 2,f 3,f 4} and W = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4} with responsive preferences
13stated as
f1 f2 f3 f4 w1 w2 w3 w4
{w1,w 3}{ w2,w 3}{ w1,w2}{ w1,w2}{ f2,f 3}{ f1,f 3}{ f1,f2}{ f1,f2}
{w1,w 4}{ w2,w 4}{ w1}{ w1}{ f2,f 4}{ f1,f 4}{ f1}{ f1}
{w1,w 2} {w2,w 1} {w2}{ w2} {f2,f 1} {f1,f 2} {f2}{ f2}
{w3,w4}{ w3,w4} ∅∅ {f3,f4}{ f3,f4} ∅∅
{w3,w 2}{ w3,w 1}
. . .
. . . {f3,f 1}{ f3,f 2}
. . .
. . .
{w4,w 2}{ w4,w 1}{ f4,f 1}{ f4,f 2}
{w1}{ w2}{ f2}{ f1}
{w3}{ w3}{ f3}{ f3}
{w4}{ w4}{ f4}{ f4}






The unique pairwise-stable matching ￿ is described by bold characters in the above table.
Now consider a group deviation (T,￿0) from ￿ with T = {f1,f 2,w 1,w 2} and ￿0 fully
matched up within T only (in rectangles in the above table). This is bene￿cial for each
agent in T, and it blocks ￿. Moreover, since all partners of deviators are individually
stable and preferences are responsive, (T,￿0) is an individually stable deviation from
￿, in turn implying that there is no setwise-stable matching in this example.13 In
contrast, ￿0 is not pairwise-stable with passive outsiders, since, say, agent f1 follows
the suggested deviation plan only partially. She is willing to establish partnerships with
w1, yet she would not be willing to establish her partnership with w2: instead, she keeps
her partnership with w3. Thus, it can be shown that the unique pairwise-stable matching
￿ is also a credibly group-stable matching. ⁄
In the next section, we investigate credibly group-stable matchings under various
preference restrictions.
13Note that preferences in this example (and the one in Sotomayor 1999) do not satisfy strong
substitutability; thus non-existence of a setwise-stable matching does not contradict Echenique and
Oviedo￿s (2003) equivalence result. For example, let S = {w1,w 2} and T = {w3,w 4}.A l t h o u g h
S ￿f1 T and w2 ∈ Chf1(S ∪ {w2})={w1,w 2},w eh a v ew2 / ∈ Chf1(T ∪ {w2})={w3,w 4}.
143 The Results
3.1 Substitutable Preferences
The ￿rst result shows that credible group stability implies pairwise stability under
substitutable preferences.
Proposition 1 E v e r yc r e d i b l yg r o u p - s t a b l em a t c h i n gi sp a i r w i s e - s t a b l e ,w h e n” is sub-
stitutable.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive of the statement. Let ” be substitutable and
￿ be a pairwise-unstable matching. There are two possibilities: (i) there exists i ∈
F ∪ W with Chi (￿(i)) 6= ￿(i), or (ii) there is a pair (f,w) ∈ F ￿ W such that
w ∈ Chf(￿(f)∪{w}) and f ∈ Chw(￿(w)∪{f}). We inspect these two cases separately:
Case (i): A deviation ({i},￿ 0) with ￿0(i)=Chi (￿(i)) ⊂ ￿(i) is executable, since agent
i has no incentive to recover any of the discontinued partnerships in ￿. Hence, ￿ is not
credibly group-stable.
Case (ii): Since Case (i) does not hold, ￿ is an individually stable matching. Let ￿0(f)=
Chf(￿(f) ∪ {w}), ￿0(w)=Chw(￿(w) ∪ {f}), ￿0(w0)=￿(w0)\{f} for any worker w0 ∈
W\Chf(￿(f) ∪ {w}),a n d￿0(f0)=￿(f0)\{w} for any ￿rm f0 ∈ F\Chw(￿(w) ∪ {f}).
Then group deviation ({f,w},￿ 0) from ￿ is executable, since agents f and w have
no incentive to recover any partnership that was discontinued in ￿ or remain single.
Hence, ￿ is not credibly group-stable, completing the proof. ⁄
However, there may be a pairwise-stable matching that is not credibly group-stable
even when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has substitutable
preferences, as the following example shows.
Example 4 Consider the following 16-agent many-to-many matching problem. Let
F = {f1,f 2,f 3,f 4, ﬂ f1, ﬂ f2, ﬂ f3, ﬂ f4} and W = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4, ﬂ w1, ﬂ w2, ﬂ w3, ﬂ w4}.
Each ￿rm has responsive preferences described as follows: each ￿rm without a bar has
quota 3, and her preferences are lexicographic in the order of the ranking of individual
partners, that is, for example, for f1, {w1} is more preferable than {ﬂ w2, ﬂ w3, ﬂ w4}.E a c h
15￿rm with a bar has quota 1. Firm preferences over individual partners are as follows:
f1 f2 f3 f4 ﬂ f1 ﬂ f2 ﬂ f3 ﬂ f4
w1 w2 w3 w4 w1 w2 w3 w4
ﬂ w2 ﬂ w3 ﬂ w4 ﬂ w1 w2 w1 w4 w3
ﬂ w3 ﬂ w4 ﬂ w1 ﬂ w2 ∅∅∅∅





ﬂ w1 ﬂ w2 ﬂ w3 ﬂ w4






Workers have substitutable preferences. Their preferences are stated as follows:
{f2, ﬂ f2}￿ w1 {f2,f 1, ﬂ f1} ￿w1 {f2,f 1}￿ w1 {f2, ﬂ f1}￿ w1 {f2}￿ w1
{ﬂ f2}￿ w1 {f1, ﬂ f1}￿ w1 {f1}￿ w1 { ﬂ f1}￿ w1 ∅ ￿w1 ...,
{f1, ﬂ f1}￿ w2 {f1,f 2, ﬂ f2} ￿w2 {f1,f 2}￿ w2 {f1, ﬂ f2}￿ w2 {f1}￿ w2
{ﬂ f1}￿ w2 {f2, ﬂ f2}￿ w2 {f2}￿ w2 { ﬂ f2}￿ w2 ∅ ￿w2 ...,
{f4, ﬂ f4}￿ w3 {f4,f 3, ﬂ f3} ￿w3 {f4,f 3}￿ w3 {f4, ﬂ f3}￿ w3 {f4}￿ w3
{ﬂ f4}￿ w3 {f3, ﬂ f3}￿ w3 {f3}￿ w3 { ﬂ f3}￿ w3 ∅ ￿w3 ...,
{f3, ﬂ f3}￿ w4 {f3,f 4, ﬂ f4} ￿w4 {f3,f 4}￿ w4 {f3, ﬂ f4}￿ w4 {f3}￿ w4
{ﬂ f3}￿ w4 {f4, ﬂ f4}￿ w4 {f4}￿ w4 { ﬂ f4}￿ w4 ∅ ￿w4 ...,
{f1} ￿ ﬂ w1 {f2,f3,f4}￿ ﬂ w1 {f2,f 3}￿ ﬂ w1 {f2,f 4}￿ ﬂ w1 {f2}￿ ﬂ w1
{f3,f 4}￿ ﬂ w1 {f3}￿ ﬂ w1 {f4}￿ ﬂ w1 ∅ ￿ ﬂ w1 ...,
{f2} ￿ ﬂ w2 {f3,f4,f1}￿ ﬂ w2 {f3,f 4}￿ ﬂ w2 {f3,f 1}￿ ﬂ w2 {f3}￿ ﬂ w2
{f4,f 1}￿ ﬂ w2 {f4}￿ ﬂ w2 {f1}￿ ﬂ w2 ∅ ￿ ﬂ w2 ...,
{f3} ￿ ﬂ w3 {f4,f1,f2}￿ ﬂ w3 {f4,f 1}￿ ﬂ w3 {f4,f 2}￿ ﬂ w3 {f4}￿ ﬂ w3
{f1,f 2}￿ ﬂ w3 {f1}￿ ﬂ w3 {f2}￿ ﬂ w3 ∅ ￿ ﬂ w3 ...,
16{f4} ￿ ﬂ w4 {f1,f2,f3}￿ ﬂ w4 {f1,f 2}￿ ﬂ w4 {f1,f 3}￿ ﬂ w4 {f1}￿ ﬂ w4
{f2,f 3}￿ ﬂ w4 {f2}￿ ﬂ w4 {f3}￿ ﬂ w4 ∅ ￿ ﬂ w4 ....
Given this preference pro￿le, a matching ￿ that matches each agent with the partners in
bold characters in the above tables is a pairwise-stable matching. However, a matching
￿0 that matches each agent with the partners in rectangles in the above tables is also a
pairwise-stable matching. Matching ￿0 Pareto-dominates ￿ and ￿0 is pairwise-stable in
F ∪ W together imply that group deviation (F ∪ W,￿0) from ￿ is executable. ⁄
Note that in this example, the number of partners of an agent can diﬀer in diﬀer-
ent pairwise-stable matchings. This is one of the properties that do not hold under
substitutability in many-to-one matching problems, unlike responsiveness.14
3.2 Responsive and Categorywise-Responsive Preferences
In the last subsection, we observed that equivalence between pairwise stability and
credible group stability cannot be obtained when the preference pro￿le is substitutable.
Example 4 showed that this result is true even if one side has a responsive preference
pro￿le. However, in the UK markets, matching mechanisms utilize students￿ prefer-
ence orderings over individual consultants in each category and consultants￿ preference
orderings over individual students. Thus given the usage of these mechanisms, the
simplest assumptions on preference domains are that students￿ preference pro￿le is
categorywise-responsive, and that consultants￿ preference pro￿le is responsive. Thus,
it appears to be important to investigate pairwise stability in this domain. Throughout
this subsection, we assume that F has responsive preferences and W has categorywise-
responsive preferences.
We introduce one more piece of notation. For any agent i ∈ F ∪ W,a n da n y
S ⊆ Mi,l e tβi(S) ∈ S be such that j ”i βi(S) for all j ∈ S; i.e., βi selects the least
preferable element in the set of partners.
Using βi, it is easy to see that we can state the following lemma about pairwise-
stable matchings and executable deviations in this domain.
14Martinez, Masso, Neme, and Oviedo [15] show that the set of single agents may not be the
same in pairwise stable matchings in a college admissions problem (many-to-one matching problem)
under substitutability, while Roth [17] shows it is the case under responsiveness (a.k.a. rural hospital
theorem). This phenomenon of substitutable preferences seems to play an important role in our
counterexample, too. See also Hat￿eld and Milgrom [10] for an extensive discussion of many-to-one
matching problems by using an integrating approach.
17Lemma 1 When ”F is responsive with quotas (qf)f∈F,a n d”W is categorywise-
responsive with categories and quotas being (Kw,(Mk
w,q k
w)k∈Kw)w∈W, we have the fol-
lowing:
(1) A matching ￿ is pairwise-stable if and only if
(a) (respecting quotas)
(i) for any f ∈ F, |￿(f)| ≤ qf,a n d
(ii) for any w ∈ W and any k ∈ Kw, |￿(w) ∩ Mk
w| ≤ qk
w;
(b) (no blocking individual) for any i ∈ T, βi (￿(i)) ￿i ∅;a n d
(c) (no blocking pair) for any pair (f,w) ∈ F ￿W with f ∈ Mk
w\￿(w) for some
k ∈ Kw,
(A) ∅ ￿f w,o rβf(￿(f)) ￿f w with |￿(f)| = qf,o r
(B) ∅ ￿w f,o rβw(￿(w) ∩ Mk
w) ￿w f with |￿(w) ∩ Mk
w| = qk
w.
(2) For each matching ￿, a group deviation (T,￿0) from ￿ is executable if and only
if
(a) (respecting quotas)
(i) for any f ∈ F ∩ T, |￿0(f)| ≤ qf,a n d
(ii) for any w ∈ W ∩ T and any k ∈ Kw, |￿0(w) ∩ Mk
w| ≤ qk
w;
(b) (no blocking individual among insiders possibly with passive outsiders)
(i) for any i ∈ T, βi (￿0 (i)) ￿i ∅,
(ii) for any f ∈ F ∩ T,a n da n yw ∈ ￿(f)\(T ∪ ￿0 (f)), ∅ ￿f w,o r
βf (￿0 (f)) ￿f w with |￿0(f)| = qf,a n d





\(T ∪ ￿0 (w)), ∅ ￿w f,o rβw
¡













\￿0(w) for some k ∈ Kw,
(A) ∅ ￿f w,o rβf(￿0(f)) ￿f w with |￿0(f)| = qf,o r
(B) ∅ ￿w f,o rβw(￿0(w) ∩ Mk
w) ￿w f with |￿0(w) ∩ Mk
w| = qk
w.
S i n c et h ep r o o fo fL e m m a1i si m m e d i a t ef r o mt h ed e ￿nitions of pairwise stability,
executability, responsiveness, and categorywise responsiveness, we skip it. The ￿rst
main result of this paper is as follows:
18Theorem 1 The set of pairwise-stable matchings is equivalent to the set of credibly
group-stable matchings, when ”F is responsive, and ”Wis categorywise-responsive.
Proof. One direction has been proved in Proposition 1 under substitutable preferences.
Thus, we will prove that every pairwise-stable matching is credibly group-stable, when
”F is responsive, and ”Wis categorywise-responsive. Let ”F be responsive with quo-
tas (qf)f∈F,a n d”W is categorywise-responsive with categories and quotas given by
(Kw,(Mk
w,q k
w)k∈Kw)w∈W. We prove this direction by contradiction. Suppose that ￿ is
a pairwise-stable matching and that (T,￿0) is an executable group deviation from ￿.
This supposition will be made throughout the proof.
First, we investigate the properties of newly created partnerships. Note that for





\￿(w) for some k ∈ Kw (a new partner),
we have f,w ∈ T,s i n c e￿0 is obtainable from ￿.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e(T,￿0) is executable,
for these f and w,w eh a v ew ￿f ∅ and f ￿w ∅ by Condition 2-b-i of Lemma 1. We
￿rst prove the following claims.
























.S i n c e (T,￿0) is an executable deviation from ￿, by Condition 2-b-
io fL e m m a1 ,w eh a v ew ￿f ∅ and f ￿w ∅. By Condition 1-c of Lemma 1 the
last two statements imply that ￿ is pairwise-unstable, that is because (f,w) blocks ￿,
contradicting that ￿ is pairwise-stable. Therefore, such agents f and w do not exist.♦





\￿(w) ,e i t h e rβf (￿(f)) ￿f w





￿w f with |￿(w) ∩ Mk
w| = qk
w.





\￿(w).S i n c e(T,￿0) is
an executable deviation from ￿, by Condition 2-b-i of Lemma 1 we have w ￿f ∅ and





￿w f. First consider
βf (￿(f)) ￿f w. There are two cases: |￿(f)| = qf or |￿(f)| <q f:
Case 1. |￿(f)| = qf: Then the proof of Claim 2 is complete.
Case 2. |￿(f)| <q f:S i n c e ￿ is pairwise-stable, there are no blocking pairs. In







ﬂ ﬂ￿(w) ∩ Mk
w
ﬂ ﬂ = qk
w by Condition 1-c of Lemma 1.





￿w f can be dealt with in a similar manner. ♦
Claim 2 allows us to introduce a new concept. For any worker w,a n yo fh e r





\￿(w),w es a yt h a t￿rm f is pointed by






￿w f and |￿(w) ∩ Mk
w| = qk
w. Claim 2 says that in any newly
created partnership, there is always an agent who is pointed by the other. Let PF be
the set of pointed ￿rms, i.e.
PF = {f ∈ F : ∃w ∈ ￿
0(f)\￿(f) such that βf (￿(f)) ￿f w and |￿(f)| = qf}.
For any f ∈ PF, since there exists some w ∈ ￿0 (f)\￿(f),p a i r(f,w) is a newly created
partnership, and f,w ∈ T must hold.
Claim 3:I fa￿rm f is pointed by r ≥ 1 workers, then |￿(f)\￿0(f)| >r .
P r o o fo fC l a i m3 .L e t￿rm f be pointed by r workers w1,w 2,...,w r.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
βf(￿(f)) ￿f wh for all h ∈ {1,...,r} and ￿rm f￿s quota qf is binding under ￿.T h e
latter statement implies that ￿rm f needs to discontinue partnerships with at least r
incumbent partners (each of whom is more preferable than w1,w 2,...,wr)i no r d e rt o
have new partnerships with w1,w 2,...,wr.S i n c e ￿0(f) ￿f ￿(f) and ”f is responsive
with quota qf, there should be at least one more new partner w0 ∈ ￿0(f)\￿(f) such that
w0 ￿f βf(￿(f)) for ￿rm f to be compensated. Hence, ￿rm f establishes at least r +1
new partnerships. Since ￿rm f￿s quota is binding under ￿, ￿rm f must discontinue
strictly more than r old partnerships to create room for these new partners under ￿0.♦
This claim simply says that if a ￿rm is pointed by r workers, then she needs to
discontinue at least one additional partnership to improve her situation.
Claim 4:L e tf ∈ PF and w ∈ ￿(f)\￿0(f) be such that f ∈ Mk
w for some k ∈ Kw (i.e.,
partnership (f,w) is discontinued). Then (i) w ∈ T,( i i )
ﬂ ﬂ￿0 (w) ∩ Mk
w








P r o o fo fC l a i m4 .L e t￿rm f ∈ PF be pointed by worker w0 ∈ T and let worker
w ∈ ￿(f)\￿0(f) be such that f ∈ Mk
w for some k ∈ Kw, that is, partnership (f,w) is
discontinued by the group deviation (T,￿0).S i n c ef is pointed by w0, βf (￿(f)) ￿f w0.
Since w0 ∈ ￿0 (f) and w ∈ ￿(f)\￿0 (f),w eh a v ew ￿f βf (￿0 (f)). We prove each part
separately:
(i) Suppose that w/ ∈ T.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t w ∈ ￿(f)\(T ∪ ￿0 (f)). This together
with w ￿f βf (￿0 (f)) contradicts executability of (T,￿0) by Condition 2-b-ii of
Lemma 1. Therefore w ∈ T.
(ii) Suppose that
ﬂ ﬂ￿0(w) ∩ Mk
w
ﬂ ﬂ <q k
w.S i n c e￿ is pairwise-stable, we have f ￿w ∅ by
Condition 1-b-ii of Lemma 1. Since f,w ∈ T (see (i)), this together with w ￿f
βf (￿0 (f)) contradicts the executability of (T,￿0) by Condition 2-c of Lemma 1.
Therefore
ﬂ ﬂ￿0(w) ∩ Mk
w
ﬂ ﬂ = qk
w.





.S i n c e f,w ∈ T (see (i)), this together
with w ￿f βf (￿0 (f)) contradicts the executability of (T,￿0) by Condition 2-c of






We de￿ne one more new concept. Let DW be the set of workers each of whom has
discontinued at least one partnership in some category with some ￿rm in PF, i.e.







0(w) for some k ∈ Kw}.
By Claim 4 (i), it immediately follows that DW ⊂ T.
Claim 5:L e tw ∈ DW.I fw has discontinued r ≥ 1 partnerships with ￿rms in PF in







ﬂ ﬂ = r,
then there are at least r ￿rms in PF who are pointed by worker w in category k.
Proof of Claim 5.L e tw ∈ DW be such that she has discontinued r ≥ 1 partnerships





\￿(w).W e w i l l





\￿0(w),t h a ti s ,￿rm f is one of the






￿w f.S i n c ef0 ∈ ￿0 (w)∩Mk
w and f ∈ ￿(w)∩Mk
w, it follows





. By Claim 2, we have either (i) βf0 (￿(f0)) ￿f0 w with





￿w f0 with |￿(w) ∩ Mk
w| = qk
w. Obviously, (ii)
does not hold in this case, and (i) follows. Thus, f0 is pointed by w, and f0 ∈ PF.











is pointed by w. By Claim 4 (ii), we have
ﬂ ﬂ￿0 (w) ∩ Mk
w
ﬂ ﬂ = qk
w.S i n c ew has discontinued
r partnerships with ￿rms in Mk
w ∩ PF, she must form at least r partnerships as well.
Thus, there must be at least r ￿rms in Mk
w ∩ PF that are pointed by w. ♦
Claim 6: The set PF is non-empty.
P r o o fo fC l a i m6 .S i n c e (T,￿0) is a group deviation from ￿,a n d￿ is pairwise-stable
(and thus cannot be blocked by an individual), T ∩ W 6= ∅,a n df o ra n yw ∈ W ∩
T, ￿0(w)\￿(w) 6= ∅.S u p p o s e t h a t PF = ∅.T h e n , f o r a n y w ∈ W ∩ T,a n da n y






￿w f. This implies ￿(w) ￿w ￿0(w) by categorywise responsiveness of
”w, contradicting (T,￿0) is a group deviation from ￿.T h u s ,PF is non-empty. ♦
We now are ready to complete the proof of the theorem. Set PF is non-empty
by Claim 6. Let r ≥ 1 be the number of partnerships that have been discontinued
by ￿rms in PF.B y t h e d e ￿nition of DW, these discontinued partnerships are with
21workers in DW.B y C l a i m 5 , w o r k e r s i n DW who discontinued r partnerships with
￿rms in PF would establish at least r new partnerships with ￿rms in PF by pointing
them. By Claim 3, those pointed ￿rms in PF should have discontinued at least r +1
partnerships. This is a contradiction. Therefore (T,￿0) cannot be executable. ⁄
It is important to have no category in the preferences of one side (here F). If both
sides have categorywise-responsive preference pro￿les, the equivalence between pairwise
stability and credible group stability does not hold (since a symmetric argument of
Claim 3 is not valid for set W, which has a categorywise-responsive preference pro￿le:
agent w￿s loss in a category may be compensated by a gain in another category).
Indeed, the following example shows that our result is no longer true when both sides
have categorywise-responsive preferences.15
Example 5 Consider a many-to-many matching problem with F = {f1,f 2,f 3,f 4} and
W = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4}. There are two categories for each agent, and the partner set in
each category is given as odd-indexed partners for the ￿rst category and even-indexed
partners for the second category. Each agent has a unit quota for each category. The
preferences are categorywise-responsive and stated as follows:
f1 f2 f3 f4 w1 w2 w3 w4
{w3,w 2}{ w1,w 4}{ w1,w 4}{ w3,w 2}{ f1,f4}{ f3,f 2}{ f3,f 2}{ f1,f 4}
{w3,w 4} {w3,w 4} {w1,w 2} {w1,w 2} {f3,f 4} {f3,f 4} {f1,f 2} {f1,f 2}
{w1,w2}{ w1,w2}{ w3,w4}{ w3,w4}{ f1,f2}{ f1,f2}{ f3,f4}{ f3,f4}
{w1,w 4}{ w3,w 2}{ w3,w 2}{ w1,w 4}{ f3,f 2}{ f1,f 4}{ f1,f 4}{ f3,f 2}
{w3}{ w4}{ w1}{ w2}{ f4}{ f3}{ f2}{ f1}
{w1}{ w2}{ w3}{ w4}{ f2}{ f1}{ f4}{ f3}
{w2}{ w1}{ w4}{ w3}{ f1}{ f2}{ f3}{ f4}
{w4}{ w3}{ w2}{ w1}{ f3}{ f4}{ f1}{ f2}









Let ￿ be a matching described by bold characters, and let ￿0 be a matching described by
rectangles. Both of them are pairwise-stable matchings. Moreover, ￿0 (i) ￿i ￿(i) for
all i ∈ F ∪ W.T h e r e f o r e ,(F ∪ W,￿0) is an executable group deviation from ￿. ⁄
As l i g h t l ym o d i ￿e dv e r s i o no ft h ea b o v ee x a m p l es h o w st h a tt h e r em a yn o te x i s ta
credibly group-stable matching when both sides have categorywise-responsive prefer-
ences (see Example 6 in the appendix.)
15This insightful example has been suggested by a referee.
224S t r a t e g i c - F o r m G a m e s
We can rewrite our matching problem as a strategic-form game in which each agent
is a player, each player simultaneously announces a subset of players she wants to be
matched with, and a match is made if and only if each of a pair of players announces
e a c ho t h e r ￿ sn a m e .H e r e ,w es h o wt h a tt h i sg a m ei su s e f u lt oc l a r i f yt h er e l a t i o n s h i p s
among the notions of stable matchings in matching problems. A strategic-form game
is a list G(F∪W)=( F ∪ W,(Si,u i)i∈F∪W), where for any player i ∈ F∪W,h e rs t r a t e g y
set is Si =2 Mi,a n dh e rp a y o ﬀ function is ui : Πj∈F∪WSj → R such that ui(s) ≥ ui(s0)
if and only if mi(s) ”i mi(s0),w h e r emi(s)={j ∈ Mi : j ∈ si and i ∈ sj} is the list of
the sets of players who are matched with i in each category under a matching resulting
from strategy pro￿le s ∈ Πj∈F∪WSj.L e t m =( mi)i∈F∪W be the vector function
such that for any s ∈ Πj∈F∪WSj, m(s) is the matching resulting from s.F o r a n y
I ⊆ F ∪ W,a n ys ∈ Πj∈F∪WSj and any s0
I ∈ Πj∈ISj, the pair (I,s0
I) is a strategic
coalitional deviation from s if ui (s0
I,s −I) >u i (s) for every i ∈ I.As t r a t e g yp r o ￿le
s∗ ∈ Πj∈F∪WSj is a strong Nash equilibrium of G(F ∪W) if there exists no strategic
coalitional deviation from s∗ (Aumann [3]). In fact, it is easy to see that the set of
matchings generated by strong Nash equilibria of the strategic-form game is equivalent
to the set of group-stable matchings. Thus, if we apply the notion of a strong Nash
equilibrium to a many-to-one (and, of course, to a one-to-one) matching game, the set
of the matchings generated from strong Nash equilibria and the set of pairwise-stable
matchings are equivalent without invoking the weak core (by the reason described
earlier).16 However, in a many-to-many matching game, a strong Nash equilibrium
may not exist (recall Example 1 and consider the strategic-form game de￿ned for this
many-to-many matching problem).
Next we de￿ne a weaker solution concept based on credibility of strategic coalitional
deviations: coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston [4]).17
For I ⊆ F ∪ W,c o n s i d e rareduced game G(I,s−I) that is a strategic-form game
with players in I and is created from G(I) by setting each player j ∈ (F ∪W)\I to be a
passive player who plays a given sj ∈ Sj no matter what happens. A coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium (CPNE) is recursively de￿ned as follows:
(a) For any i ∈ F ∪W and any s−i ∈ Πj∈(F∪W)\{i}Sj,s t r a t e g ys∗
i ∈ Si is a CPNE of
reduced game G({i},s −i) if there is no s0
i ∈ Si with ui (s0
i,s −i) >u i (s∗
i,s −i).
16One of the results in Kara and S￿nmez [12] shows that in a two-sided many-to-one matching
problem, the same game form implements pairwise-stable correspondence in strong Nash equilibrium.
17In a network formation problem, Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs [6] and Dutta and Mu-
tuswami [7] use CPNE of a strategic-form game to analyze the resulting networks.
23(b) Pick any positive integer r<|F ∪ W|. Let all CPNEs of a reduced game
G(J,s−J) be de￿ned for any J ⊂ F∪W with |J| ≤ r and any s−J ∈ Πi∈(F∪W)\JSi.
Then,
(i) for any I ⊆ F ∪ W with |I| = r +1 , s∗
I is self-enforcing in reduced
game G(I,s−I) if for every J ⊂ I we have s∗
J is a CPNE of reduced game
G(J,(s−I,s ∗
I\J)) of G(I,s−I),a n d
(ii) for any I ⊆ F ∪ W with |I| = r +1 , s∗
I is a CPNE of reduced game
G(I,s−I) if s∗
I is self-enforcing in reduced game G(I,s−I),a n dt h e r ei sn o
other self-enforcing s0
I such that ui (s0
I,s −I) >u i (s∗
I,s −I) for every i ∈ I.
For any I ⊆ F ∪ W and any strategy pro￿le s, let CPNE(G(I,s−I)) denote the
set of CPNE strategy pro￿les on I for the game G(I,s−I). For any strategy pro￿le s,a
strategic coalitional deviation (I,s0
I) from s is credible if s0
I ∈ CPNE(G(I,s−I)).A
CPNE is as t r a t e g yp r o ￿le that is immune to any credible strategic coalitional deviation.
The second main result of the paper is the following:
Theorem 2 The set of pairwise-stable matchings, the set of credibly group-stable
matchings, and the set of matchings generated from coalition proof Nash equilibria
of the strategic-form game G(F ∪ W) are all equivalent, when ”F is responsive, and
”Wis categorywise-responsive.
We know that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability if ”F is
responsive and ”W is categorywise-responsive (Theorem 1). Thus, we need to show
only that the resulting matching of a CPNE is pairwise-stable (proved below in Lemma
2), and that a credibly group-stable matching is the outcome of a CPNE (proved
below in Lemma 3). Although these statements will be proved under substitutability,
the equivalence between pairwise stability and credible group stability requires the
stronger preference restriction of Theorem 1.18 We start with Lemma 2. Recall that
for any strategy pro￿le s and any agent i ∈ F ∪ W, mi(s)={j ∈ si : i ∈ sj} and that
m =( mi)i∈F∪W.
Lemma 2 If s∗ ∈ CPNE(G(F ∪ W)) then m(s∗), the matching generated from s∗,
is a pairwise-stable matching, when ” is substitutable.
Proof. Let s∗ ∈ CPNE(G(F ∪ W)). Suppose that matching m(s∗) is not pairwise-
stable. Then, either (i) there is i ∈ F ∪ W such that Chi(mi(s∗)) 6= mi(s∗) (matched
18Under substitutability, Lemmata 2 and 3 show that the set of credible group-stable matchings ⊆
the set of matchings generated from CPNEs ⊆ the set of pairwise-stable matchings.
24with an individually unstable agent), or (ii) there is a pair (f,w) ∈ F ￿ W such
that w ∈ Chf(mf(s∗) ∪ {w}) and f ∈ Chw(mw(s∗) ∪ {f}) (pair (f,w) blocks m(s∗)).
Suppose that case (i) is true. This means that there is a player i who is willing to
discontinue some of the partnerships under m(s∗).S h ec a nd ot h a ti nG(F ∪ W) by
simply not announcing such partners. Considering G({i},s ∗
−{i}), we can easily see that
s∗
i is not a CPNE of the reduced game. This is a contradiction. Thus, suppose that
case (ii) is true, and there is a pair (f,w) ∈ F ￿ W that blocks m(s∗).C o n s i d e r a
strategic coalitional deviation by {f,w} with (s0
f,s 0
w),w h e r es0
f and s0
w are such that
s0
f = Chf(mf(s∗) ∪ {w}) and s0
w = Chw(mw(s∗) ∪ {f}). This deviation is obviously
bene￿cial for both agents f and w,s i n c emi(s0
f,s 0
w,s ∗
−{f,w})=Chi(mi(s∗) ∪ {j}) ￿i
mi (s∗) for each i ∈ {f,w} and j ∈ {f,w}\{i} (pair (f,w) blocks m(s∗)). Since s∗ is
a Nash equilibrium (a CPNE is a Nash equilibrium as well), for any i ∈ F ∪ W and
any ￿ si ∈ Si,w eh a v emi(s∗) ”i mi(￿ si,s ∗




mi(s∗) that for any ￿ si ∈ Si,w eh a v emi(s0
f,s 0
w,s ∗
−{f,w}) ￿i mi(￿ si,s ∗
−i).L e t {i,j} =
{f,w}. Since mi(￿ sf, ￿ sw,s ∗




−{f,w})=Chi(mi(s∗)∪{j}) ”i mi(￿ sf, ￿ sw,s ∗
−{f,w}). The last two statements








w)) is a credible strategic coalitional deviation from s∗, contradicting that
s∗ is a CPNE and completing the proof of the lemma. ⁄
Lemma 3 For every credibly group-stable matching ￿,t h e r ee x i s t ss ∈
CPNE(G(F ∪ W)) such that ￿ = m(s),w h e n” is substitutable.
Proof. Recall that a CPNE is immune to credible strategic coalitional deviations in the
game and a credibly group-stable matching is immune to executable group deviations in
the problem. Hence, if for any strategy pro￿le s and any credible strategic coalitional
deviation (T,s0
T) from s in game G(F ∪W), there exists an executable group deviation
from matching m(s) in the many-to-many matching problem, then the proof of the
lemma will be complete. We will prove this as follows:
Let s be a strategy pro￿le and (T,s0
T) be a credible strategic coalitional deviation
from s. We denote the resulting strategy pro￿le by s0 =( s0
T,s −T).L e t￿ be a matching
generated from s, i.e. ￿ = m(s),a n dl e t￿0 be the one generated from s0, i.e. ￿0 =
m(s0). Note that s0
j = sj for any j ∈ (F ∪ W)\T. We will show that (T,￿0) is an
executable group deviation from ￿.M o r e s p e c i ￿cally, we will prove that (i) for any
i ∈ T, Chi(￿0(i) ∪ (￿(i)\T)) = ￿0(i), and (ii) for any i,j ∈ T with j ∈ Mi\￿0(i),
j ∈ Chi(￿0(i) ∪ (￿(i)\T) ∪ {j}) implies i/ ∈ Chj(￿0(j) ∪ (￿(j)\T) ∪ {i}).
25Condition (i): Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an agent i ∈ T with
Chi(￿0(i) ∪ (￿(i)\T)) ￿i ￿0(i). Then pro￿le s0
T is not immune to agent i￿s credible
strategic deviation s00
i = Chi(￿0(i) ∪ (￿(i)\T)),s i n c eui(s00
i,s 0
F∪W\{i}) >u i (s0), contra-
dicting s0
T ∈ CPNE(G(T,s−T)).
Condition (ii): Suppose, to the contrary, that for some ￿rm f ∈ T ∩F and worker w ∈
T ∩W with w 6∈ ￿0(f),w e h a v e w ∈ Chf(￿0(f)∪(￿(f)\T)∪{w}) and f ∈ Chw(￿0(w)∪
(￿(w)\T) ∪ {f}). T h i si m p l i e st h a tf o ra n yi ∈ {f,w} and any j ∈ {f,w}\{i},w e
have Chi(￿0(i) ∪ (￿(i)\T) ∪ {j}) ￿i ￿0(i).C o a l i t i o n {f,w} can deviate from s0 by
setting s00




−{f,w})=Chi(￿0(i) ∪ (￿(i)\T) ∪ {j}) ￿i ￿0(i)=mi (s0).S i n c e f and w




neither f nor w nor jointly {f,w} can credibly deviate from (s00
f,s 00
w,s 0
−{f,w}),i nt u r n











T ∈ CPNE(G(T,s−T)), completing the proof of the lemma. ⁄
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper establishes a theoretical foundation of pairwise stability in many-to-many
matching problems when group deviations are allowed. We de￿ne credible group stabil-
ity by restricting group deviations based on their credibility and prove the equivalence
between pairwise stability and credible group stability when one side has responsive
preferences while the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. This domain
￿ts well with the UK hospital-intern markets. Moreover, in the same domain, we show
the equivalence between pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated
by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of appropriately de￿ned noncooperative matching
games.
W ea l s oi n v e s t i g a t ew h a th a p p e n si ft h ep r e f e r e n c ed o m a i ni se x p a n d e d .W es h o w
by Examples 4 and 5 that if the domain is expanded then the equivalence no longer
holds, since some pairwise-stable matchings can be Pareto-ordered.
We conclude noting that our Theorems 1 and 2 hold under responsive preferences for
general non-bipartite multi-partner matching problems.19 The proof is almost identical
to the ones of Theorems 1 and 2, so it is omitted. A general multi-partner matching
problem is a list (N,(Mi,”i)i∈N) such that N is a ￿nite set of agents, and for each
i ∈ N, Mi ⊆ N\{i} is the set of feasible partners for i,a n d”i is a preference ordering
19Our results do not apply in S￿nmez￿s [25] generalized matching problems (thus, neither in Alkan￿s
[1] k-sided matching problems with k ≥ 3, nor in housing market problems). Our theorem requires
that a partnership can be formed by a bilateral agreement only.
26over 2Mi.
Theorem 3 In general multi-partner matching problems, the set of pairwise-stable
matchings, the set of credibly group-stable matchings, and the set of matchings generated
from coalition-proof Nash equilibria of the strategic-form game G(N) are all equivalent,
when ”N is responsive.
Appendix
Example 6 Consider a many-to-many matching problem with F =
{f1,f 2,f 3,f 4,f 5,f 6,f 7,f 8} and W = {w1,w 2,w 3,w 4,w 5,w 6,w 7,w 8}. There are
two categories for each agent, and the partner set in each category is given as odd-
indexed partners for the ￿rst category and even-indexed partners for the second category
(the latter four agents in each category have only one acceptable agent each). Each
agent has unit quota for each category. The preferences are categorywise-responsive
a n ds t a t e da sf o l l o w s :
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8
{w3,w 2}{ w1,w 4}{ w1,w 4}{ w3,w 2}{ w1}{ w2}{ w3}{ w4}
{w3,w 6}{ w5,w 4}{ w1,w 8}{ w7,w 2} ∅∅∅∅





{w1,w2}{ w1,w2}{ w3,w4}{ w3,w4}
{w1,w 6}{ w5,w 2}{ w3,w 8}{ w7,w 4}
{w1,w 4}{ w3,w 2}{ w3,w 2}{ w1,w 4}
{w3}{ w4}{ w1}{ w2}
{w1}{ w2}{ w3}{ w4}
{w2}{ w1}{ w4}{ w3}
{w6}{ w5}{ w8}{ w7}






27w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 w6 w7 w8
{f1,f4}{ f3,f 2}{ f3,f 2}{ f1,f 4}{ f2}{ f1}{ f4}{ f3}
{f5,f4}{ f3,f 6}{ f7,f 2}{ f1,f 8} ∅∅∅∅





{f1,f2}{ f1,f2}{ f3,f4}{ f3,f4}
{f5,f 2}{ f1,f 6}{ f7,f 4}{ f3,f 8}
{f3,f 2}{ f1,f 4}{ f1,f 4}{ f3,f 2}
{f4}{ f3}{ f2}{ f1}
{f2}{ f1}{ f4}{ f3}
{f1}{ f2}{ f3}{ f4}
{f5}{ f6}{ f7}{ f8}






For example, for agent f1, in the even category, w2 is the best, w6 is the second best,
and w4 is the worst partners respectively. UnlikeE x a m p l e5 ,p a i r w i s e - s t a b l em a t c h i n g
is unique (the F-optimal and the W-optimal matchings are identical): a pairwise-stable
matching ￿ is described by bold characters (the latter four agents in each category is
unmatched). Now let ￿0 be a matching described by rectangles. Note that ￿0 is not
pairwise-stable, since w6 and f1 can deviate. However, ￿0 is pairwise-stable within
T = {f1,f 2,f 3,f 4,w 1,w 2,w 3,w 4},a n d￿0 (i) ￿i ￿(i) for all i ∈ T. Therefore (T,￿0) is
an executable group deviation from ￿, and there is no credibly group-stable matching.⁄
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30Appendix for the Referees
In this Appendix, we will show that ￿1,...,￿9 are the only individually rational
matchings in Example 2. Let ￿ be an individually rational matching.
Claim 1: We have (i) ￿(f4)=￿(f5)=∅ or ￿(f4)=￿(f5)={w1,w 2}, and (ii)
￿(w4)=￿(w5)=∅ or ￿(w4)=￿(w5)={f1,f 2}.
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 .We prove two statements separately.
(i) Suppose that ￿(f4) 6= ∅. Then, w2 ∈ ￿(f4) must hold. This implies ￿(w2)={f2,f 4}
or {f5,f 4}.
Case 1. ￿(w2)={f2,f 4}:I nt h i sc a s e ,￿(f2)={w3,w 2} or {w1,w 2}.I n t h e f o r m e r
case, ￿(w3)={f3,f 2} holds, and ￿(f3)={w1,w 3} or {w2,w 3}.S i n c e￿(w2)={f2,f 4},
￿(f3)={w1,w 3} must follow. This then implies ￿(w1)={f1,f 3},a n dt h u s￿(f1)=
{w2,w 1} or {w3,w 1} must hold. However, neither w2 nor w3 has f1 as a partner. This is
a contradiction. Thus, we have the latter case ￿(f2)={w1,w 2}.T h i si m p l i e s￿(w1)=
{f1,f 2},a n d￿(f1)={w2,w 1} or {w3,w 1}. The former contradicts ￿(w2)={f2,f 4},
and the latter implies ￿(w3)={f3,f 1}.T h u s ,￿(f3)={w1,w 3} or {w2,w 3}. However,
this contradicts ￿(w1)={f1,f 2} and ￿(w2)={f2,f 4}. There is no individually
rational matching for Case 1.
Case 2. ￿(w2)={f5,f 4}: In this case, ￿(f5)={w1,w 2} follows, and ￿(w1)={f1,f 5}
or {f4,f 5} must hold. In the former case, ￿(f1)={w3,w 1} is implied since ￿(f1)=
{w2,w 1} contradicts ￿(w2)={f5,f 4}.A si nC a s eI ,￿(f1)={w3,w 1} implies ￿(f3)=
{w1,w 3} or {w2,w 3}, and these contradict ￿(w2)={f5,f 4} and ￿(w1)={f1,f 5},
respectively. Thus, ￿(w1)={f1,f 5} cannot happen, and ￿(w1)={f4,f 5} must hold.
This implies ￿(f4)={w1,w 2}. Hence, we have shown that ￿(f4) 6= ∅ implies ￿(f4)=
￿(f5)={w1,w 2}.
Since f4 and f5 are totally symmetric, we can repeat exactly the same argument
for the case of ￿(f5) 6= ∅.I f￿(f5) 6= ∅,t h e nw eh a v e￿(f4)=￿(f5)={w1,w 2}.T h i s
proves the ￿rst statement in the claim.
(ii) Suppose that ￿(w4) 6= ∅. Then, ￿(w4) contains f2. Then, ￿(f2)={w3,w 4},
{w1,w 4} or {w5,w 4} holds.
Case 1. ￿(f2)={w3,w 4}:T h i si m p l i e s￿(w3)={f3,f 2}, and thus ￿(f3)={w1,w 3}
or {w2,w 3}. In the former case, ￿(w1)={f1,f 3} and thus ￿(f1)={w2,w 1} (￿(f1)=
{w3,w 1} contradicts ￿(w3)={f3,f 2}). This implies ￿(w2)={f2,f 1}. This contradicts
￿(f2)={w3,w 4}.
Case 2. ￿(f2)={w1,w 4}:T h i si m p l i e s￿(w1)={f1,f 2}, and thus ￿(f1)={w3,w 1}
(otherwise, ￿(f1)={w2,w 1},a n d￿(w2)={f2,f 1} that contradicts ￿(f2)={w1,w 4}).
1This implies ￿(w3)={f3,f 1} and thus ￿(f3)={w2,w 3} (otherwise, ￿(f3)={w1,w 3}
that contradicts ￿(w1)={f1,f 2}). This implies ￿(w2)={f2,f 3}. This contradicts
￿(f2)={w1,w 4}.
Case 3. ￿(f2)={w5,w 4}: This implies ￿(w5)={f1,f 2},a n dt h u s￿(f1)={w2,w 5},
{w3,w 5},o r{w4,w 5}.
Case a. ￿(f1)={w2,w 5}: This implies ￿(w2)={f2,f 1}, which contradicts ￿(f2)=
{w5,w 4}.
Case b. ￿(f1)={w3,w 5}: This implies ￿(w3)={f3,f 1},t h u s￿(f3)={w1,w 3} or
{w2,w 3}.I f ￿(f3)={w1,w 3},t h e n￿(w1)={f1,f 3} that contradicts ￿(f1)=
{w3,w 5}.I f ￿(f3)={w2,w 3},t h e n￿(w2)={f2,f 3} that contradicts ￿(f2)=
{w5,w 4}.
Case c. ￿(f1)={w4,w 5}:T h i s i m p l i e s ￿(w4)={f2,f 1}, and this is consistent
with ￿(f2)={w5,w 4}. Hence, we have shown that ￿(w4) 6= ∅ implies ￿(w4)=
￿(w5)={f1,f 2}.
Since w4 and w5 are totally symmetric, we can repeat exactly the same argument
for the case of ￿(w5) 6= ∅.I f￿(w5) 6= ∅,t h e nw eh a v e￿(w4)=￿(w5)={f1,f 2}.T h i s
proves the second statement in the claim. ♦
Claim 2: Suppose that w1 ∈ ￿(f1). Then, ￿ ∈ {￿1,￿ 3,￿ 4,￿ 5}.
P r o o fo fC l a i m2 .Note that w1 ∈ ￿(f1) implies that ￿(f4)=￿(f5)=∅ and ￿(w4)=
￿(w5)=∅ must hold by Claim 1. Since w1 ∈ ￿(f1), ￿(f1)={w2,w 1} or {w3,w 1}.
These two cases are treated as Cases 1 and 2 in order.
Case 1. ￿(f1)={w2,w 1}:S i n c e f1 ∈ ￿(w2), ￿(w2)={f2,f 1} holds. This implies
w2 ∈ ￿(f2): i.e., either ￿(f2)={w3,w 2},o r￿(f2)={w1,w 2}.
Case a. ￿(f2)={w3,w 2}:W e h a v e ￿(w3)={f3,f 2},a n d￿(f3)={w1,w 3} or
{w2,w 3} must follow. In the former case, ￿(w1)={f1,f 3} h o l d s ,a n dw eh a v ea
matching ￿5. The latter case contradicts ￿(w2)={f2,f 1}, and this cannot be a
matching.
Case b. ￿(f2)={w1,w 2}:W eh a v ef2 ∈ ￿(w1) and ￿(w1)={f1,f 2}. This implies
that we have matching ￿1.
Case 2. ￿(f1)={w3,w 1}: This implies ￿(w3)={f3,f 1}. There are two possibilities:
￿(f3)={w1,w 3},o r￿(f3)={w2,w 3}.
2Case a. ￿(f3)={w1,w 3}:W eh a v e￿(w1)={f1,f 3}, and this creates the individually
rational matching ￿3.
Case b. ￿(f3)={w2,w 3}:W e h a v e ￿(w2)={f2,f 3}.T h u s , ￿(f2)={w3,w 2} or
{w1,w 2}. The former is not a matching, since ￿(w3)={f1,f 3}.T h e l a t t e r
generates a matching ￿4.
Thus, w1 ∈ ￿(f1) implies that individually rational matching ￿ must be one of
￿1,￿ 3,￿ 4, and ￿5. ♦
Claim 3: Suppose that w1 / ∈ ￿(f1). Then, ￿ ∈ {￿2,￿ 6,￿ 7,￿ 8,￿ 9}.
P r o o fo fC l a i m3 . Suppose that w1 / ∈ ￿(f1). T h i si se q u i v a l e n tt of1 / ∈ ￿(w1).T h i s
implies ￿(w1)={f4}, {f4,f 5} or ∅. By Claim 1, ￿(w1)={f4} does not occur.
Case 1. ￿(w1)={f4,f 5}: This implies ￿(w2)={f4,f 5} (Claim 1). Note that w3 does
not form any partnership unless f3 forms partnership with w3,a n dt h a tf3 would not do
so without having either w1 or w2.S i n c ew1 and w2 have binding quotas, ￿(w3)=∅.
Now suppose that ￿(w4) 6= ∅. Then, by Claim 1, ￿(f1)=￿(f2)={w4,w 5}.T h i s
generates ￿8. Instead, suppose that ￿(w4)=∅. Then, by Claim 1, ￿(w5)=∅.T h i s
generates ￿7.
Case 2. ￿(w1)=∅: This implies ￿(f4)=￿(f5)=∅ (Claim 1). Focus on w3.T h e r ea r e
two cases.
Case a. f3 ∈ ￿(w3): In this case, ￿(f3)={w2,w 3} must follow, and thus ￿(w3)=
{f2,f 3}.T h i si m p l i e s￿(w2)={f2,f 3}.S i n c ew2 ∈ ￿(f2),w eo b t a i n￿2 (Claim
2).
Case b. ￿(w3)=∅:T h i si m p l i e s￿(f3)={w2} or ∅. Suppose that ￿(f3)={w2}.
In this case, ￿(w2)={f2,f 3} holds, and thus ￿(f2)={w3,w 2} or {w1,w 2}.
However, either one contradicts ￿(w3)=∅ or ￿(w2)=∅, respectively. Thus,
￿(f3)=∅.N o w ,f o c u so nw2.S i n c e￿(f5)=∅, f2 ∈ ￿(w2) or ￿(w2)=∅ holds. In
the former case, we have ￿(f2)={w3,w 2} or {w1,w 2}. Either case contradicts
￿(w3)=∅ or ￿(w2)=∅ again. Thus, we have shown that ￿(f3)=￿(f4)=
￿(f5)=￿(w1)=￿(w2)=￿(w3)=∅. By applying Claim 1, we conclude that ￿
is either ￿6 or ￿9.
All cases together prove that w1 / ∈ ￿(f1) implies ￿ ∈ {￿2,￿ 6,￿ 7,￿ 8,￿ 9}. ♦
Claims 2 and 3 show that the set of individually rational matchings is {￿1,￿ 2,...,￿9}
completing the proof.
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